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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
A basic tenet of our legal system is that laws should be drawn
to give the people a warning as to what actions are impermissible.
The court of appeals attempted to accomplish this goal. It has rede-
fined the guidelines by which a lawyer may act and be judged. The
decision has not granted the lawyer carte blanche to recklessly criti-
cize a judicial proceeding, nor has it cast aside the right to a fair
trial as the dissent suggests. On the contrary, it is implicit in the
decision that a lawyer's comments are needed to guarantee a fair
trial. A criminal trial can evoke the emotion of the public and pro-
duce massive coverage by the press. Comment by a defendant's
attorney at the initial stage of the case may offset an inherent public
presumption of guilt that accompanies an indictment."' Instead of
having to remove himself from the case, which would deprive the
defendant of counsel, or being forced to remain silent with the fear
of disciplinary measures, the active attorney may criticize the court.
The court, in redefining the area of acceptable criticism by the
attorney, has reassured the defendant of a fair trial. The litigating
counsel, with the knowledge of his rights and duties, may now re-
turn to the role of the learned judicial critic.
JEFFREY R. COOPER
The End of Fee Schedules: The Sherman Act
Applies to Lawyers Also
Desiring to purchase a home in Fairfax County, Virginia, peti-
tioners contacted a local lawyer concerning a title examination. The
lawyer quoted them the fee suggested in the minimum fee schedule
published by the respondent Fairfax County Bar Association (the
"County Bar") and enforced by the respondent Virginia State Bar
(the "State Bar").' In an attempt to find an attorney willing to
"I We do recognize the great benefits derived from allowing uninhibited comment by know-
ledgeable attorneys involved in civil litigation." Id. at 259.
:19. 6 HARV. CIv, RI(rrs-Civ. LIAR L. REV. 595, 599 (1971).
I. The State Bar had published reports condoning fee schedules and had issued two
ethical opinions indicating that fee schedules could not be ignored. VIRGINIA STATE BAR, 1969
MINIMtUM FEE SCIEDIIIE REPORT; VIRGINIA STATE BAR, 1962 MINIMUM FEE SCHEDULE REPORT;
VIRGINIA STATE BAR COMM. ON LEGAL, ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 170 (1971); VIRGINIA STATE BAR
COMM. ON LEGAIL ETIC(S. OPINIONs, No. 98 (1960). The reports "provided the impetus for the
County Bar, on two occasions, to adopt minimum fee schedules." Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar, 95 S. Ct. 2004, 2015 n.21 (1975).
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charge less than the schedule dictated, the petitioners wrote letters
to 36 other lawyers inquiring about their fees for title examination.
Nineteen written replies were received; all indicated that the
responding attorney would adhere to the County Bar's fee schedule.
Petitioners, on behalf of themselves and similarly situated home
owners, brought a class action for injunctive relief and damages in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
against the State Bar and the County Bar,2 alleging that the opera-
tion of the minimum fee schedule violated section 1 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act." After a trial solely on the issue of liability, the dis-
trict court found the State Bar to be exempt from antitrust prosecu-
tion for its role with respect to the fee schedule.4 As to the County
Bar, however, the district court found liability and enjoined the
publication of the fee schedule. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision as to the
State Bar, but reversed as to the County Bar,5 holding that the fee
schedule did not restrain interstate commerce" and that the practice
of law is a "learned profession" 7 which is exempt from the provisions
of the antitrust laws. On certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court, held, reversed and remanded:' The minimum fee schedule,
as published by the County Bar and enforced by the State Bar,
2. Goldfarh v. Virginia State Bar, 355 F. Supp. 491, 492 n.1 (E.D. Va. 1973). The suit
originally included the Fairfax County Bar Association, the Alexandria Bar Association, the
Arlington County Bar Association and the Virginia State Bar as defendants, but the Alexan-
dria and Arlington associations agreed to a consent judgment whereby they were directed to
cancel their existing fee schedules and were enjoined from publishing future fee schedules.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). Section 1 provides that "[elvery contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal .... "
4. See notes 30-36 infra and accompanying text. The State Bar also contended that it
was protected by the eleventh amendment, but the district court's holding as to the State
Bar did not require the issue to be decided. 355 F. Supp. at 496. Even when a state is not
named as a party, a suit by private persons may nonetheless be barred by the eleventh
amendment if the liability imposed must be paid from public funds in the state treasury.
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). The hallmark of Edelman, however, is the require-
ment that any liability imposed must be paid from public funds in the state treasury. It is
unlikely that any liability paid out of a state bar association's treasury will be sufficient to
invoke an eleventh amendment immunity.
5. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1974).
6. See notes 24-29 infra and accompanying text.
7. See notes 37-44 infra and accompanying text.
8. Upon remand, the district court was to consider whether the eleventh amendment,
exempted the State Bar from antitrust prosecution under the circumstances. 95 S. Ct. at 2015
n.22.
19761
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
constitutes price fixing in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 95 S. Ct. 2004 (1975).
The use of fee schedules dates back at least to 1795, when the
Rhode Island Bar Association agreed that "no member shall give
any opinion upon any law question for a sum less than $1.00."I
Generally, though, the use of fee schedules did not flourish until the
1950's."11 Since the district court opinion in Goldfarb, however, many
bar associations have chosen to abandon their fee schedules rather
than run the risk of a lawsuit."
Most of these fee schedules have their origin in Canon 12 of the
old ABA Canons of Professional Ethics."2 The current provision
dealing with attorney's fees in the Virginia State Bar Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility (which is identical to the provision in the ABA
Code of Professional Responsibility) indicates that fees vary accord-
ing to many factors, and that "[sluggested fee schedules and eco-
nomic reports of state and local bar associations provide some guid-
ance on the subject to reasonable fees."' 3 Although this suggests a
voluntary schedule, the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics has
9. Maxwell, Bar Association Minimum Fee Bills: TheirImpact Upon C.L.L.A. Practices,
71 COM. LA. 278, 278 (1966).
10. Merrell, Do We Need A Fee Schedule?, 42 MICH. ST. B.J. Apr. 1963, at 35.
I1. Wall Street J., Apr. 11, 1973, at 1, col. 1. The policy aspects of minimum fee sched-
tiles have been widely discussed. See, e.g., Arnould & Corley, Fee Schedules Should be
Abolished, 57 A.B.A.J. 655 (1971); Miller & Weil, Let's Improve, Not Kill, Fee Schedules,
58 A.B.A.J. 31 (1972); Morgan, Where Do We Go From Here With Fee Schedues?, 59 A.B.A.J.
1403 (1973); Comment, Bar Association Minimum Fee Schedules and the Antitrust Laws,
1974 DuKE L.J. 1164; Comment, Minimum Fee Schedules-The Battle and the War: Gold-
farb at the Fourth Circuit, 60 VA. L. REV. 1415 (1974); Note, Bar Association Fee Schedules
and Suggested Alternatives: Reflections on a Sherman Exemption that Doesn't Exist, 3
iI.C.L.A.-ALASKA L. REV. 207 (1974).
12. Arnould & Corley, supra note 11, at 655. The ABA Canons of Professional Ethics were
adopted in 1908. Canon 12, in detailing the procedure for setting fees, lists six relevant factors;
one oft hese is the "customary charges of the Bar for similar services." Canon 12 also indicates
that
iun determining the customary charges of the Bar for similar services, it is
proper for a lawyer to consider a schedule of minimum fees adopted by a Bar
Association, but no lawyer should permit himself to be controlled thereby or to
follow it as his sole guide in determining the amount of his fee.
In 1938, the Supreme Court of Virginia adopted Canons of Professional Ethics which were
essentially equivalent to the ABA's canons. 171 Va. xxiii (1938). Effective January 1, 1970,
the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics were replaced by a Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity. Virginia's Canons of Professional Ethics were replaced by a Code of Professional Respon-
sibility (again, essentially equivalent to the ABA's code) as of January 1, 1971. 211 Va. 295
(1970).




said that "the habitual charging of fees less than those established
by a minimum fee schedule, or the charging of such fees without
proper justification, may be evidence of unethical conduct . . ."'4
The basic idea underlying a fee schedule is to provide attorneys
with adequate compensation and, as an ethical matter, to discour-
age attorneys from soliciting business by discounting prices. How-
ever, as a consequence of the enforcement mechanisms available in
bar associations' ethical codes, attorneys are forced to charge fees
in accordance with the fee schedules' rates. The invariable result of
the use of fee schedules is thus a system which offers the consumer
of legal services substantial uniformity of price. Any agreement
among competitors not to charge below a specified price has been
held to be a "per se" violation of the Sherman Act-that is, it is
illegal without regard to the reasonableness or the intent of the
agreement. " Rejecting the County Bar's position that its fee sched-
ule was merely advisory, the Supreme Court stated that the con-
certed action by members of the bar to control prices constituted "a
classic illustration of price fixing,"'" and it was thus held to be a per
se violation of section 1.
The Court did indicate, however, that a purely advisory fee
schedule, issued to provide guidelines or to exchange price informa-
14. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHIcS, FORMAL OPINIONS, No. 302, printed at 48
A.B.A.J. 159 (1962); cf. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, INFORMAL OPINIONS, No. 585
(1962). But see ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, FORMAL OPINIONS, No. 323, printed at
56 A.B.A.J. 1087 (1970) ("mere failure to follow a minimum fee schedule, even when habitual,
cannot, standing alone and absent evidence of misconduct, afford a basis for disciplinary
action."). For the corresponding Virginia opinions, see note 1 supra.
15. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). Under a per se rule, the
motives of the conspirators are irrelevant-good intentions are thus not a defense. United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). Liability depends solely upon the
existence of an agreement to fix prices; actual adherence to the price schedule need not be
shown. Id. at 224-26 n.59.
16. 95 S. Ct. at 2011.
17. 95 S. Ct. at 2010. A determination of the "different question" mentioned by the
Court would require an inquiry into the type of price information exchanged in an advisory
fee schedule. An association does not violate section 1 by participating in statistical reporting
on the average cost to all members without identifying the parties to specific transactions.
Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925). Detailed reports of specific
transactions with identified customers though, even without an agreement to adhere to a
price schedule, has been held illegal. United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S.
333 (1969). Thus, while the mere compilation and dissemination among competitors of pricing
statistics does not prove a Sherman Act conspiracy, the frank exchange of all the details of a
fairly complicated pricing system is a factor appropriately considered in determining the
existence of a price-fixing conspiracy. Morton Salt Co. v. United States, 235 F.2d 573 (10th
Cir. 1956).
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tion, without a showing of an actual restraint on trade would present
a "different question."' 7 A strong argument exists, however, for
treating the two situations as the same. Neither the nonmandatory
nature of the rates, nor the absence of official sanctions, should be
sufficient to eliminate liability." The desire of attorneys to comply
with announced professional norms, coupled with the natural ap-
peal of a scheme promising increased income, should inevitably
result in a form of horizontal price fixing, a per se unreasonable
restraint of trade."'
Once the Court determined that a minimum fee schedule com-
stitued a per se restraint of trade, the bar associations had to be
considered in violation of the Sherman Act2" unless found to be
exempt. According to Goldfarb, such exemption could have existed
under the following theories: first, that the practice of law is a purely
local activity, not involved in interstate commerce;2' second, that
the promulgation and maintenance of such schedules constitute
"state action" within the meaning of Parker v. Brown;2 or third,
that the practice of law is neither trade nor commerce, but rather a
"learned profession."23
The Court's first inquiry regarding possible exemptions in-
volved the jurisdictional applicability of the Sherman Act to the
legal profession. Since Congress passed the Sherman Act on the
basis of its power to regulate interstate commerce, the reach of the
Sherman Act is coextensive with that power.24
18. United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485 (1950) (minimum
charges established by local real estate board constituted price fixing).
19. Id.
20. Instances where fee schedules have previously been held to violate the Sherman Act
include, for example, the pricing schedules issued by state pharmaceutical associations in
Northern Cal. Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. United States, 306 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 862 (1962), and United States v. Utah Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 29 (D.
Utah), aff'd per curiam, 371 U.S. 24 (1962). However, fixed commissions charged small
investors have been held not to violate antitrust laws against price fixing because the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission's authority to approve or disapprove commission rates carries
with it the power to grant the securities industry immunity from antitrust laws. Gordon v.
New York Stock Exch., Inc., 95 S. Ct. 2598 (1975).
21. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
22. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
23. FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931). At the time of the Goldfarb decision, the
,Justice Department had an antitrust case pending in the United States District Court in
Oregon, seeking to enjoin the Oregon State Bar from further publication, distribution or
suggest ion of a schedule of attorneys' fees. On the State Bar's motion for summary judgment,
the court rejected the application of both the "state action" and "learned profession" exemp-
tions. United States v. Oregon State Bar, 385 F. Supp. 507 (D. Ore. 1974).
24. See. e.g., United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
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Two distinct categories of activities have been held to involve
interstate commerce: those directly in the flow of interstate com-
merce, and those which are intrastate in nature but which neverthe-
less substantially affect interstate commerce.25 In holding that a
title examination is an integral part of an interstate transaction, the
Court in Goldfarb demonstrated that the adoption and use of the
schedule substantially affected interstate commerce in two ways.
The first was that a significant portion of funds furnished for pur-
chasing homes in Fairfax County came from outside the state and
that the lenders placing these funds required title examinations.
The second was that significant amounts of real estate loans in
Fairfax County were guaranteed by federal agencies located outside
the state. "Thus . . . the transactions which create the need for the
particular legal services in question frequently [were] interstate
transactions."
26
Although the Court stated that there may be legal services
which have no nexus with interstate commerce, and thus are beyond
the reach of the Sherman Act, such a situation would be quite
unique in view of the broad scope given the commerce power of
Congress." A restraint on trade which relates only to the local aspect




Restraints, to be effective, do not have to be applied all along the
line of movement of interstate commerce. The source of the re-
straint may be intrastate, as the making of a contract or combi-
nation usually is . . . . If it is interstate commerce that feels the
pinch, it does not matter how local the operation that applies the
squeeze."
On the question of the "state action" exemption, the district
court and the Fourth Circuit reached similar conclusions-that the
See generally Note, The Commerce Clause and State Antitrust Regulation, 61 COLUM. L. REV.
1469 (1961).
25. Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320 (1967) (per curiam); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v.
American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948).
26. 95 S. Ct. at 2011.
27. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
Ill (1942). But see United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
28. In oral argument, counsel for the petitioners went so far as to contend that a local
bar fee schedule would affect interstate commerce in the case of a fee charged for drawing a
will for "a little old lady in the middle of the state" who had no out-of-state beneficiaries or
property. Allen, Do Fee Schedules Violate Antitrust Law?, 61 A.B.A.J. 565, 567 (1975).
29. United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfg. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949).
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State Bar was exempt from the Sherman Act for whatever part it
played in the County Bar's adoption and enforcement of its fee
schedule. This "state action" exemption originated in Parker v.
Brown,:' where the Supreme Court ruled that the Sherman Act did
not govern actions undertaken by state officials at the direction of
the state's legislature. The case has since been interpreted to confer
antitrust immunity on private persons who engage in anticompeti-
tive activities under a similar state mandate."
The Parker court limited the reach of its decision by asserting
that states could not immunize private antitrust violations by
merely "authorizing" private anticompetitive activities. 2 Parker
suggested that state authorization would not be found if the state
simply failed to restrain, or acquiesced in, private anticompetitive
schemes. To be held state action, the anticompetitive practices
must instead be part of an affirmative statutory duty, or otherwise
compelled. :
The inquiry in Goldfarb was directed at precisely this point.
Through its legislature, Virginia has authorized its highest court to
regulate the practice of law." The State Bar contended that it was
exempt because it is by statute an "administrative agency" of the
highest court of Virginia, and is authorized to regulate professional
conduct under the court's authority. 5 The County Bar, although it
is a voluntary association and not a state agency, claimed the ethi-
cal codes and the activities of the State Bar "prompted" it to issue
30. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). It has been said that the purpose of the exemption is "to prevent
confrontations between two sovereign entities, where certain economic behavior is allowed in
the particular state that contravenes provisions of the federal antitrust laws." Comment, The
Anatomy of Judicial Exemptions from Antitrust: A Study in Gap-Filling, 15 WAYNE L. REV.
813, 815 (1969).
31. See Kintner & Kaufman, The State Action Antitrust Immunity Defense, 23 AM. U.L.
RI:v. 527, 530 (1974).
32. 317 U.S. at 351-52.
33. Id. at 350. Two Supreme Court decisions have suggested that where the defendants'
conduct is essentially discretionary, rather than compelled by law, the Parker state action
immunity for antitrust violations may not be appropriate. In Continental Ore Co. v. Union
Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962), the Court denied that Canadian authorization
of anticompetitive conduct provided state action immunity, stating that there was "nothing
to indicate that such law in any way compelled discriminatory purchasing .... Id. at 707.
The Court referred to Parker as a case involving mandatory state regulations. d. at 706. See
also Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951). See generally Sim-
mons & Fornaciari, State Regulation as an Antitrust Defense: An Analysis of the Parker v.
Brown Doctrine, 43 U. CIN. L. REV. 61 (1974).
34. VA. COnE § 54-48 (1974 Repl. Vol.).
35. VA. CODE § 54-49 (1974 Repl. Vol.).
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fee schedules, and thus its actions also were to be considered state
action for Sherman Act purposes. However, neither the State of
Virginia, through its Supreme Court Rules, nor the Virginia Su-
preme Court's ethical codes, required the promulgation of a fee
schedule. Thus, although bar associations may arguably be part of
the state, their fee schedules are not. "It is not enough that ...
anticompetitive conduct is 'prompted' by state action; rather, anti-
competitive activities must be compelled by direction of the State
'36
On the third and final issue of whether legal services are "trade
or commerce" within the meaning of section 1 of the Sherman Act,
the district court and the Fourth Circuit in Goldfarb reached diver-
gent conclusions, with the Fourth Circuit finding a well-defined
"learned profession" exemption. The use of the term "learned pro-
fession" refers indiscriminately to two theories under which the pro-
fessions have sought antitrust immunity. The first is a "personal
services" exemption, which arose in 1922 from the language of
Federal Baseball Club, Inc. v. National League of Professional
36. 95 S. Ct. at 2015. Finding it unnecessary to continue its analysis, the Supreme Court
failed to refine further the scope of the Parker doctrine. The Court has thus left unresolved a
conflict among the lower courts as to what has normally been seen as an additional require-
ment for the state action exemption-that the activities of private parties be "actively super-
vised" by independent state officials.
A majority of the federal courts have interpreted the requirement of active supervision
to mean that the practice in question be subjected to meaningful regulation and supervision
by the state to the end that the activities result from the considered judgment of the state
regulatory authority. E.g., Norman's on the Waterfront v. Wheatley, 444 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir.
1971); Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co, 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971). See also Kintner &
Kaufman, supra note 31. A minority interpretation is found in Washington Gas Light Co. v.
Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971). In Washington Gas Light a state
regulatory agency had the power to prohibit the challenged activities, but did not do so.
Inferring that the silence of the state agency implied its approval, the Fourth Circuit found
that the active supervision requirement had been met.
The Fourth Circuit's approach significantly expands the narrow state action exemption
recognized in Parker. Sufficient state action to provide an exemption from federal antitrust
laws would seem to necessitate a more active administrative and regulatory role on the part
of the state than mere acquiescence. The Sherman Act has been interpreted as "a comprehen-
sive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the
rule of trade." Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). In view of this strong
federal policy favoring economic competition, the liberal viewpoint of Washington Gas Light
appears unwarranted, and it has been uniformly criticized by legal commentators. See, e.g.,
Simmons & Fornaciari, supra note 33, at 87-88; Note, Of Raisins and Mushrooms: Applying
the Parker Antitrust Exemption, 58 VA. L. REV. 1511, 1539-42 (1972); 85 HARv. L. REV. 670,
671-74 (1972).
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Baseball Clubs.:7 This exemption, however, has been discredited
completely by subsequent Supreme Court decisions,3" and any reli-
ance by the Fourth Circuit on Federal Baseball to support the no-
tion that personal services enjoyed a blanket exemption from the
antitrust laws seems to be misplaced.
The second line of cases involves professional services and has
its origin in the 1931 case of FTC v. Raladam Co.,40 in which the
Supreme Court indicated that the practice of medicine is not a
trade." While until Goldfarb the Court had refused to rule directly
upon the validity of this "learned profession" exemption,4" case law
in the interim had indirectly reached varying results concerning the
issue.' :
Goldfarb puts an end to this uncertainty, stating: "The nature
of an occupation, standing alone, does not provide sanctuary from
the Sherman Act, . . . nor is the public service aspect of profes-
sional practice controlling in determining whether section 1 includes
37. "IP]ersonal effort, not related to production, is not a subject of commerce." 259
U.S. 200, 209 (1922) (dictum).
38. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Radovich v. National Football League,
352 U.S. 445 (1957); United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955); United
States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222 (1955); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
39. The Fourth Circuit cited both the Federal Baseball and Raladam cases when it
discussed the "learned profession" exemption. In holding that the promulgation of a fee
schedule fell within the exemption, it did not, however, indicate to what extent it relied upon
either of these cases.
40. 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
41. "They follow a profession and not a trade, and are not engaged in the business of
making or vending remedies but in prescribing them." Id. at 653 (dictum).
42. 95 S. Ct. at 2012 n.15, citing United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds.,
339 U.S. 485 (1950), and American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
43. In 1952, for example, the Court indicated that professions may merit "special consid-
eration" because of "ethical, historical and practical" considerations which might distinguish
them from other occupations, United States v. Oregon Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 336
(1952). On the other hand, a wide range of professions, possessing many of the same charac-
teristics as attorneys, have been held to be subject to the antitrust laws. In 1943, the American
Medical Association was convicted for its attempt to obstruct a corporation offering prepaid,
group-practice medical care. American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
In 1950, the standard real estate commission, set by the Washington, D.C. real estate board,
was held to constitute price fixing. United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339
U.S. 485 (1950). Recently, the Justice Department obtained consent decrees against ethical
prohibitions by engineers, architects and accountants on competitive bidding. See United
States v. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Inc., 1972 Trade Cas. 74,007
(D.D.C. 1972); United States v. American Institute of Architects, 1972 Trade Cas. 73,981
(D.D.C. 1972); United States v. American Soc'y of Civil Eng'rs, 1972 Trade Cas. 1 73,950
(S.D.N.Y. 1972). See generally Note, The Antitrust Division v. The Professions-"No Bid-
ding" Clau.ses and Fee Schedules, 48 NOTRE DAME LAw. 966 (1973).
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professions."44 Clearly, the practice of a learned profession in and
of itself provides no exemption from the antitrust laws.
The Court's opinion, however, was very narrowly drawn. The
careful wording of the case suggests the Court's apprehension that
more controversial cases will soon follow. In holding that the prac-
tice of law is subject to the Sherman Act, Goldfarb may have effects
on the legal profession beyond the mere invalidation of minimum
fee schedules. Other professional regulations having anticompeti-
tive effects, such as prohibitions against advertising and solicita-
tion, may now be brought before the courts.45
It seems certain that the more harmful aspects of advertising
and soliciting can be prohibited without violating the antitrust laws.
The Goldfarb court concluded its opinion by recognizing that
in some instances the State may decide that "forms of competi-
tion usual in the business world may be demoralizing to the ethi-
cal standards of a profession" . . . . In holding that certain anti-
competitive conduct by lawyers is within the reach of the Sher-
man Act we intend no diminution of the authority of the State
to regulate its professions."
It remains to be seen, however, whether advertising or solicita-
tion may be prohibited altogether without violating the Sherman
Act. One potential exemption likely to be argued in support of such
a ban has been referred to as the "noncommercial purpose" exemp-
tion.47 Under this exemption, those activities of a profession which
44. 95 S. Ct. at 2013.
45. Deputy Assistant Attorney General Bruce Wilson, of the Justice Department's Anti-
trust Division, recently told a combined meeting of the Idaho State Bar and Alaska Bar
Associations:
If, as Goldfarb clearly mandates, we are going to have price competition [among
attorneys], it seems to me that we must have some means of informing the public
of what lawyers do and what lawyers can do for people .... And, after Goldfarb,
any agreement to restrict this sort of advertising could be held in violation of the
antitrust laws.
44 U.S.L.W. 2008 (July 1, 1975). See also Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. v. State
Bd. of Pharmacy, 373 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Va. 1974), where the court recognized a consumer's
right to know price information. See gereta~ly Note, Legal Ethics-Advertising and Solicita-
tion by Public Interest Law Firms, 51 TEXAS L. REV. 169 (1972); Note, Advertising, Solicita-
tion and the Profession's Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available, 81 YALE L.J. 1181 (1972).
46. 95 S. Ct. at 2016; accord, United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326
(1952). See also Selmer v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935); Levin
v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 233 F. Supp. 953 (D.D.C. 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 354 F.2d 515
(D.C. Cir. 1965).
47. Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges & Second-
ary Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Although the learned profession exemption
19761
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serve a noncommercial purpose are considered to be outside the
trade or commerce requirement of the antitrust laws, while those
which are found to be more entrepreneurial than professional are
treated as being within the coverage of antitrust legislation."
Although professing to take no view on any situation other than
the one before it, the Court in Goldfarb did state that "the practice
of law as a profession . . . has [its] business aspect, and section 1
of the Sherman Act '[o]n its face shows a carefully studied attempt
to bring within the Act every person engaged in business . . .,.
The Court goes even further to point out that
[iut would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as
interchangeable with other business activities, and automatically
to apply to the professions antitrust concepts which originated in
other areas. The public service aspect, and other features of the
professions, may require that a particular practice, which could
properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another
context, be treated differently.'
The emphasis in Goldfarb on the mercantile aspects of the practice
of law may indicate the path that will be followed when the Court
is eventually confronted with the problem of advertising and solici-
tation. Certainly, although the Court does reiterate the existence of
a heavy presumption against implicit exemptions, a plausible argu-
ment in favor of the existence of a noncommercial purpose exemp-
tion in respect to some activities can be made.
It should also be noted that prohibitions on advertising and
solicitation may not be considered per se violations of section 1, and
may, thus, be subject instead to the "rule of reason,"'" as are most
restraints of competition. Under a per se rule, agreements or prac-
may seem closely related to the noncommercial purpose exemption, it does not distinguish
theoretically between the commercial and noncommercial aspects of a profession. For a more
complete analysis, see Coons, Non-Commercial Purpose as a Sherman Act Defense, 56 Nw.
U.L. REV. 705 (1962); Note, Bar Association Fee Schedules and Suggested Alternatives:
Reflections on a Sherman Exemption That Doesn't Exist, 3 U.C.L.A.-ALASKA L. REV. 207
(1974).
48. E.g., Northern Cal. Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. United States, 306 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962); United States v. Utah Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 201 F. Supp.
29 (D. Utah), aff'd per curiam, 371 U.S. 24 (1962). In both cases, the court invalidated price
schedules for prescription drugs under the Sherman Act, distinguishing the "noncommercial"
aspects of pharmacy.
49. 95 S. Ct. at 2013 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
50. Id. at 2013 n.17.
51. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 63-70 (1911).
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tices are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore
illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have
caused or the business purpose for their use. The rule of reason,
however, calls for a balancing of the various harms occasioned to the
public against the benefits likely to result from the activity. The test
of the legality of a practice under the rule of reason is whether the
effect upon competition in the marketplace is substantially ad-
verse." A court might conclude, for instance, that the greater public
awareness of the availability of legal services, resulting from adver-
tising and solicitation, may outweigh the various evils threatened by
these activities, and forbid the bans to continue.
Thus, even though fee schedules are not immune from Sherman
Act scrutiny, it remains to be seen whether the professional bans on
solicitation and advertising will survive. If not, then it is likely that
the economics, as well as the nature and character of the practice
of law, will change dramatically.
ROBERT CORY SCHNEPPER
Compelling State Interest Test Applied to Denial
of Rezoning Request
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. ("Metropolitan"),
organized for the purpose of developing low and moderate income
housing, acquired a vacant 15-acre parcel for a proposed 190-unit,
federally subsidized, townhouse development in the village of Ar-
lington Heights, a suburb of Chicago. The property was part of an
80-acre parcel belonging to a Catholic religious order which had its
novitiate and high school thereon. The larger parcel had always
been zoned R-3, single-family, and was surrounded by single-family
homes.' The proposed townhouses would require a rezoning of the
15-acre parcel to R-5, multifamily. Metropolitan took the necessary
administrative steps to obtain that rezoning. The village's Plan
Commission, after holding public hearings, recommended against
the rezoning as, under its comprehensive plan, rezoning to R-5
52. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
1. The religious order's use of the land was a pre-existing, nonconforming use at the time
the first zoning ordinance went into effect in 1959.
19761
